

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-10

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R 240251 Z JUN 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

S E C R E T STATE 123414

EXDIS

FOLL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO BANGKOK CANBERRA KUALA LUMPUR
SAIGON CINCPAC FROM JAKARTA 24 JUN 73 REPEATED TO YOU FOR INFO
QUOTE

E C R E T JAKARTA 7514

EXDIS

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: OR ID

SUBJECT: INDONESIA AND ICCS

1. DEPUTY C- IN- C GENERAL SUMITRO, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED
FROM VISIT TO INDO ICCS CONTINGENT SOUTH VIETNAM, SENT
WORD TODAY HE WISHED TO SEE ME, AND TOGETHER
WITH BAKIN (INTELLIGENCE) CHIEF SUTOPO JUWONO, RECEIVED
ME IN BAKIN' S SAFEHOUSE. SUMITRO' S SUBSEQUENT REMARKS, DELI-
VERED IN SOMEWHAT MORE CIRCUITOUS STYLE THAN USUAL FOR
HIM, INDICATED THAT:

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(A) HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT HE BELIEVES HE FOUND
TO BE GROWING PRESENCE NORTH VIETNAMESE, OPERATING
UNDER FICTION THEY ARE PGR, IN SOUTH VIETNAM
WITH NO ACTION PRESENT OR CONTEMPLATED BY

ARVN TO PUSH THEM OUT. ROAD AS CONTINUATION OF
HO CHI MINH TRAIL WHICH WILL LINK UP WITH HIGHWAY
14 BEING COMPLETED AND THERE APPEARS TO BE UNRESTRICTED
MOVEMENT NORTH VIETNAMESE MEN AND MATERIAL INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.
WHILE THERE IS ABSENCE COUNTER ACTION TO THIS BY
ARVN THERE IS AT SAME TIME INFILTRATION OF NVN CADRE
INTO TOWNS AND CITIES OF SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH
SUGGESTS MEANS WILL EVENTUALLY BE IN PLACE
FOR POLITICAL PREVALENCE NVN OVER RVN.

(B) SUMITRO ALSO CONCERNED THAT INDONESIA MIGHT
NOT BE ATTUNED TO U. S. OUTLOOK IN REGARD TO FOREGOING.
HE INDICATED HIS PERUSAL CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT SHOWED LACK OF
ANYTHING WHICH DEALT WITH PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE IN SOUTH
VIETNAM OR WITH RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM OF THEIR BEING
THERE. HE EXPRESSED STRONG DESIRE TO KNOW BASIC
AMERICAN THINKING IN THIS REGARD. HE SAID, IN EFFECT,
THAT IF WE ANTICIPATE EVENTUAL TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM
BY HANOI, THAT IS ALL RIGHT BUT INDONESIA WOULD LIKE TO KNOW
IT AS IT WOULD AFFECT INDONESIA AND HOW INDONESIA CONDUCTS ITSELF
IN ICCS. " WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR ATTITUDE," SUMITRO SAID.

(C) WHEN I ASKED GENERAL SUMITRO WHETHER HE HAD SEEN
ANYONE IN OUR EMBASSY SAIGON, HE SAID HE HAD PURPOSELY
STAYED AWAY FROM BOTH OUR EMBASSY AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT IN ORDER AVOID COMPROMISING INDONESIAN
POSTURE OF IMPARTIALITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE SAID HE
HAD ALSO INSTRUCTED GENERAL DHARSONO TO RECEIVE ALL
INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM OUR EMBASSY, GVN, ETC., IN
SAIGON BUT TO REFRAIN FROM COMMENTING, PROVIDING INFOR-
MATION OR OTHERWISE COMPROMISING INDONESIA'S POSITION AS
IMPARTIAL MEMBER OF ICCS. " WE CAN DISCUSS THESE THINGS
HERE FULLY, THAT IS A DIFFERENT MATTER," SUMITRO SAID
WITH LAUGH. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION SUMITRO SAID
HE BELIEVED INDONESIAN ICCS CONTINGENT HAD SUCCEEDED
TO SOME SMALL EXTENT IN OVERCOMING INITIAL SUSPICION
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SHOWN BY " SO- CALLED" PRG, AS WELL AS OF POLES AND
HUNGARIANS ON ICCS, AND THAT THIS WAS USEFUL. " WE
APPROACHED THEM AS HUMAN BEINGS," SUMITRO SAID, " AND WHEN
THEY REACT LIKE HUMAN BEINGS THEY ARE NOT GOOD
COMMUNISTS."
HE SAID HE WAS PROUD OF WAY INDONESIAN CONTINGENT CONDUCTING
THEMSELVES AND THAT THEY WERE LEARNING GREAT DEAL
THROUGH ICCS ABOUT HOW COMMUNISTS CONDUCT THEMSELVES
AND WORK IN VIETNAM.

(D) HE HAD HEARD THAT POLES MIGHT ALSO WITHDRAW
FROM ICCS. HE WAS UNDER IMPRESSION THIEU HAD TO DO WITH
OUR HAVING EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH POLISH MODUS
OPERANDI IN ICCS. I INDICATED THAT WE HAD ALSO HEARD SUCH

NOISES AND I INDICATED IN CONFIDENCE THAT IT WAS TRUE THAT WE HAD EXPRESSED STRONG DISSATISFACTION IN WARSAW AND WASHINGTON WITH WAY POLES CONDUCTING THEIR ROLE IN ICCS.

(E) SUMITRO ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH INDEFINITE PROSPECTS OF INDONESIA'S COMMITMENT TO ICCS ROLE. IT COULD GO ON FOR SEVERAL YEARS, SUMITRO OBSERVED, WITHOUT MUCH CHANGE OR RESOLUTION.

2. DRAWING ON KISSINGER PRESS CONFERENCES AND BACKGROUNDERS, AND OTHER INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE TO ME BY DEPARTMENT, I DISCUSSED WHAT I FELT WAS BASIC PHILOSOPHY WITH WHICH WE HAD APPROACHED NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT. I MENTIONED UNREALISM EXPECTING ABRUPT TURN ABOUT IN ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS THOSE WHO HAD SO LONG BEEN DEDICATED TO ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVES BY FORCE. IN THIS CONTEXT WE HAD NOT BEEN SURPRISED AT VIOLATIONS AND INCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH THESE HAD BEEN GREATER IN NUMBER THAN WE HAD HOPED. ON OTHER HAND, THEY HAD BEEN LESS, WE THOUGHT, THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN CASE WITHOUT ICCS. GENERAL TREND WAS TOWARD REDUCTION IN LEVEL OF VIOLENCE. IT WAS OUR PHILOSOPHY THAT WITH CONTINUED REDUCTION IN LEVEL OF VIOLENCE OTHER SIDE MIGHT BE INDUCED TO TURN FROM DESTRUCTION ACTIVITIES OF WAR TO CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES OF REHABILITATION. WE DID NOT THINK NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD
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ABANDON THEIR OBJECTIVE OF UNIFYING COUNTRY UNDER DOMINATION THEIR FORM OF GOVERNMENT. BUT PERHAPS ALL WOULD RECOGNIZE THEY COULD NOT ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE BY FORCE (SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAD MEANS, WE FELT, TO PREVENT BEING FORCED TO SUBMIT TO OTHER SIDE) AND GRADUALLY BEGIN TO WORK OUT ACCOMMODATIONS BETWEEN WARRING FACTIONS. WE COULD NOT OF COURSE SPEAK IN TERMS OF CERTAIN FUTURE RESULTS OR PLACE TIME FRAME AROUND THEM.

3. I EXPLAINED THAT GIVEN DELICACY OF NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY MR. KISSINGER AND OTHERS IN PARIS AND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINDING REPLACEMENT FOR CANADIANS ON ICCS, THESE MATTERS HAD BEEN VERY CLOSELY HELD AND THEREFORE I HAD NOT BEEN IN POSITION TO DISCUSS THEM AS FULLY WITH INDONESIANS AS THEY HAD PERHAPS EXPECTED. LIKEWISE WITH RESPECT TO OUR ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, WE HAD HOPED THAT THERE COULD BE REGULAR CLOSE EXCHANGES BETWEEN EMBASSY SAIGON AND AMBASSADOR DHARSONO AND HIS STAFF. PERHAPS, I OBSERVED, WE HAD NOT BEEN AS CONSCIOUS AS WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN OF CARE INDONESIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN SOUTH VIETNAM WISHED TO EXERT TO AVOID IMPRESSION THEY WERE

OTHER THAN IMPARTIAL TOWARD US AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE.
GENERAL SUMITRO NODDED VIGOROUS AGREEMENT. IT IS BETTER WE
DISCUSS THESE THINGS HERE; WE CAN DO IT QUITE EASILY, ANYTIME,"
HE REPEATED. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD SPEEDED UP HIS
DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON TO BE GONE BEFORE JUNE 18
AND CELEBRATION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
DAY, " SO I WOULDN' T BE EXPLOITED."

4. I TOLD GENERAL SUMITRO I WOULD REPORT HIS
CONCERNS AND HIS OBSERVATIONS AND THAT
I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT WHEN THERE WAS SOMEONE IN
THE AREA LIKE AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN OR OTHERS WHO HAD BEEN
PARTICIPANT IN NEGOTIATIONS AND THEREFORE CLOSER TO AMERICAN
THINKING AND ANALYSIS THAT WENT INTO THEM THAN I WAS
WE WOULD TRY TO GET HIM DOWN HERE TO TALK TO THEM;
ALTERNATIVELY
WHEN SOMEONE LIKE THAT MIGHT BE ELSEWHERE IN AREA
WE MIGHT TRY TO ARRANGE QUIET, UNPUBLICIZED MEETING IN
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SOME NEUTRAL PLACE FOR HIM OR GENERAL SUTOPO JUWONO OR
SOMEONE WHO COULD DERIVE FIRST HAND INFORMATION AND FEEL
FOR THE SITUATION. GENERAL SUMITRO REACTED ENTHUSIASTICALLY
TO THAT IDEA.

5. DURING COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION, SUMITRO AND
SUTOPO SHOWED AWARENESS THAT I HAD SOUGHT THROUGH
FOREIGN MINISTER ADAM MALIK ON PREVIOUS DAY INDONESIA' S
SUPPORT IN INFLUENCING MALAYSIA TO REPLACE
CANADA ON ICCS. SUMITRO HAD SOME FURTHER COMMENTS ON
THIS SUBJECT. HE FELT THAT INDONESIAN- MALAYSIAN
COLLABORATION IN ICCS WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. BUT HE WAS
CONCERNED ABOUT DRAIN OF 300 OFFICERS IN COUNTRY
WITH MALAYSIA IN SHORT SUPPLY OF EFFECTIVE MILITARY OFFICERS
AND PROBLEMS OF INSURGENCY IN SARAWAK AND ELSEWHERE IN
COUNTRY. BUT IF POLES SHOULD WITHDRAW, SUMITRO SAID,
INDONESIANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE BRAZIL
PARTICIPATE, ALONG WITH MALAYSIA. THEY WERE NOT SO SURE, HE
ADDED, ABOUT FRENCH WHO HE KNEW WERE MOST ANXIOUS TO PARTICIPATE
(HE INDICATED INDONESIAN CONTACTS IN PARIS HAD
LEARNED). HE FEARED THIS MIGHT BE FOR FRANCES'
OWN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND OTHER REASONS OF SELF
INTEREST. ON OTHER HAND, IF FRENCH COULD BE INFLUENTIAL
WITH BOTH SIDES TO REDUCE CONFLICT AND
FIND MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION IN VIETNAM, PERHAPS THAT WOULD
BE ALL RIGHT. BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS
INCLINED AGAINST ADDING EUROPEAN COUNTRY, INCLUDING
SCANDINAVIAN, TO ICCS AS REPLACEMENT FOR EITHER CANADA
OR POLAND.

6. WE ALSO DISCUSSED BRIEFLY BLATANT AND UNDISGUISED
PARTIALITY OF HUNGARIANS AND POLES IN ICCS. I SAID

I WAS SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY WHAT APPEARED TO BE CONTRADICTION
BETWEEN PRESUMED APPROVAL OF SOVIETS OF
REDUCTION OF VIETNAM CONFLICT AND OF CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT
AND ACTIONS BY POLES AND HUNGARIANS PRESUMABLY AS
INFLUENCED BY SOVIETS. I SAID I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED
SOME SLIGHT INDICATION OF INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL
ATTITUDE BY HUNGARIANS AND POLES, HOWEVER SMALL. SUMITRO
REACTED SHARPLY. HE SAID NO ONE IN EASTERN EUROPE COULD
ACT INDEPENDENTLY. SOVIETS WISHED TO EXTEND THEIR
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INFLUENCE AROUND SOUTHEASTERN AND NORTHEASTERN FLANKS
OF CHINA, SUMITRO ASSERTED, AND EVENTUALLY TO TAKE THE
PLACE OF THE AMERICANS IN CONTAINING CHINA.

7. COMMENT: I FIND GENERAL SUMITRO'S EMPHASIS ON
IMPARTIAL INDONESIAN POSTURE SOMEWHAT MORE SENSITIVE THAN
I HAD REALIZED, ALTHOUGH AS WILL BE NOTED BY HIS
CAREFULLY CONTRIVED MEETINGS WITH ME SO FREQUENTLY AWAY
FROM HIS OFFICE AND THROUGH INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS
SUMITRO SHOWS PERSONAL INCLINATIONS TOWARD AVOIDING
TOO MUCH PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION WITH US (AND IN STRONG CONTRAST
HIS INTEREST IN COORDINATING AND HARMONIZING U. S. AND
INDONESIAN STRATEGIC VIEWS). BECAUSE OF SUMITRO'S
OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE IN INDONESIAN POLICY COUNCILS
I HAVE REPORTED SUBSTANCE THIS CONVERSATION FULLY.
I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT CAN GIVE
ME ON HOW I MIGHT FURTHER RESPOND TO SUMITRO'S
EXPRESSED CONCERNS.
GALBRAITH
QUOTE RUSH

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